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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court prior to transfer was proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that Schwartz is not entitled to a new trial 
based upon the jury verdict, because the verdict is not irreconcilably inconsistent and 
Schwartz failed to object timely? 
Standard of review: The district court's denial of Schwartz's motion for a 
new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exch., 860 P.2d 
937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation in record below: Schwartz did not preserve a timely objection to 
the jury's special verdict. Any objection to allegedly inconsistent jury findings must be 
presented prior to discharge of the jury; waiting to file a motion for new trial is not 
sufficient. Ute-Cal Land Development Corp., 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980). 
2. Was the district court within its discretion in permitting Officer Bigler's 
testimony as to the statements of Erica Wolfe and Carolyn and, if not, was the error 
harmless? 
Standard of review: The district court's decision to allow the testimony is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah App. 
1990). 
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Preservation in record below: This issue was raised below at trial. (T. 192-98, 
251-52). 
3. Was the district court within its discretion in declining Schwartz's untimely 
request for a jury instruction on passing zones and, if not, was the error harmless? 
Standard of review: A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction untimely 
requested during trial may be overturned only upon abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 668 
P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
Preservation in record below: Schwartz's request for a jury instruction on 
passing zones was made, and responded to by Benzow, during the trial. (T. 308-13). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter. 
* * * 
(2) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of 
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions 
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting 
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is a negligence action arising out of an accident which occurred on June 4, 
1995. Rae Lyn Schwartz filed a personal injury suit on July 2, 1997 (R. 2), and the case 
was tried to a jury on November 18-19, 1998 (T. 1-377). The jury returned a verdict 
finding both parties 50 percent at fault, which resulted in a judgment for the defendant 
entered on January 13, 1999. (R. 264, 270). 
Schwartz filed a motion for new trial on January 25, 1999 (R. 273), which was 
denied in an order entered March 11, 1999. (R. 297). Schwartz filed a notice of appeal 
on April 9, 1999. (R. 300). 
Statement of Facts 
On June 4, 1995, 17-year-old Rae Lyn Schwartz and a group of other bicyclists 
from New Jersey were shuttled to the top of a pass on State Road 14 in Iron County, 
Utah. (T. 56). The group had not been on this particular road before. (T. 85). 
Rae Lyn Schwartz "didn't bike a lot." (T. 102). Her bicycle was a mountain bike, 
but with road tires on it. (T. 106). On the day of the accident, the road was "really wet." 
(T. 108). The group retrieved their bicycles and helmets from the back of the truck, and 
starting pedaling west toward Cedar City, with a woman named Wendy in the lead, and 
Schwartz in the middle. (T.59). For the next 10-15 minutes, the bicyclists traveled at 
about 20-30 miles per hour, during which time they were passed by approximately five 
vehicles. (T. 60-61, 77, 121). 
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This same Sunday morning, 53-year-old David Benzow and his wife Janice 
Benzow left their summer residence at Duck Lake to attend church in Cedar City. (T. 
205-07). Driving a yellow CJ-5 jeep with a black top, the Benzows traveled a few miles 
up a dirt road to the intersection of State Road 14. (T. 206-08). As they proceeded 
toward Cedar City on SR 14, they observed some bicyclists up ahead of them on the 
highway. (T. 208, 233-34). At this location, SR 14 is divided by a double yellow line. 
(T.39). 
As Benzow approached, Schwartz was in her highest gear, and was "riding" her 
brakes "to maintain a reasonable speed," but said she was still travelling at about 25 miles 
per hour. (T. 116, 150-51, 155). Schwartz was unsure, but estimated the bicyclists' 
speed as "in the neighborhood of 30 miles an hour." (T. 222). 
Schwartz and another bicyclist testified that they were about "two feet or so" 
inside the "fog" (shoulder) line. (T. 62, 67, 89, 113). Benzow testified, however, that 
although the first two bicyclists he encountered were "near the right side of the road," the 
lead rider and at least one other rider were within a foot of the center line. (T. 212-13). 
Benzow and his wife testified that two of the riders (which would have included 
Schwartz) were either side by side, or otherwise very close together. (T. 221, 234). 
Benzow slowed down as he approached the bicyclists. (T. 220). After honking 
his horn to alert them to his presence, Benzow drove past the first two riders without 
difficulty. (T. 213-14). The lead bicyclist, however, was close to the center line, and 
Benzow could not get past. (T. 215). Accordingly, Benzow said, "I slowed down, 
because the road is blocked, and I honked my horn several more times, hoping that 
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person would pull over." (T. 215). The bicyclist remained near the center of the road for 
another 10-15 seconds, and then finally pulled over to the right so that Benzow could get 
by. (T. 215). 
While the Benzows were waiting for the lead bicyclist to move over, Schwartz 
apparently became concerned about the jeep "hovering" beside her for the 10-15 seconds. 
Schwartz claimed that Benzow started edging closer to her, and then struck the 
handlebars of her bicycle with his vehicle, causing her to crash. (T. 117). 
David and Janice Benzow testified that they never got closer to Schwartz than two 
or three feet. (T. 226). Schwartz's principal witness, Jeffery Branigan, testified that he 
saw Schwartz's handlebars turn around, but did not see the jeep strike them. (T. 96). 
When Schwartz went down, the bicyclist behind her, Erica Wolfe, crashed into Schwartz' 
bicycle and was also injured. (T. 75-76). 
Benzow stated that, as he was driving past the bicyclists, he crossed over or 
"straddled" the double yellow line in the center of the highway. (T. 222-24). Benzow 
acknowledged that he would not cross a double yellow line to pass a car or motorcycle, 
but said that he would to pass a bicycle. (T. 225). Benzow admitted that Officer Bigler 
later told him bicycles have the same rights as vehicles on the highway. (T. 225, 280). 
Benzow proceeded to Cedar City, with no indication that anything was amiss. (T. 
216). At about 1:00 p.m. that afternoon, Trooper Bigler stopped Benzow to ask about the 
accident. Bigler testified that Mr. Benzow "was completely surprised when I told him of 
the two bicycles that had crashed." (T. 261). 
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Bigler looked for any scuff or scrape marks on Benzow's vehicle, which was still 
covered in dust from travelling up the dirt road earlier in the day. ("Black top with 
Armor-All on it kind of attracts dust like a magnet."). (T. 218-19, 260). He found no 
evidence that the jeep had recently come into contact with another object. (T. 260). 
The matter was submitted to the jury on an agreed verdict form (T. 298), and the 
jury returned the following special verdict: 
Please answer questions 1 through 6 from a preponderance of the 
evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue 
presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced 
that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find 
that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." 
Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant David Benzow was 
negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the defendant David 
Benzow was either the sole proximate cause or a contributing proximate 
cause of plaintiff s injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of plaintiff Rae Lyn 
Schwartz was either the sole proximate cause or a contributing proximate 
cause of plaintiff s injuries? 
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ANSWER: Yes X No 
5. If you have answered "Yes" to either or both Questions 2 
and/or 4 then, and only then, answer the following question: 
Assuming the combined negligence of the parties to total 100%, 
what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. David Benzow 50 % 
B. Rae Lynn Schwartz 50 % 
6. If you have answered "Yes" to Question 2 and you have 
attributed to defendant David Benzow more than 50% of the total 
negligence, then and only then, state the amount of damages, if any, 
sustained by plaintiff as a proximate result of plaintiffs injuries. If 
Question 2 was answered "No," or if you have attributed to defendant 
David Benzow 50% or less of the total negligence, then do not answer this 
question. 
A. Past Medical Expenses $ 
B. Future Medical Expenses $ 
C. General Damages $ 
(pain and suffering, etc.) 
TOTAL: $ 
(R.264). The Special Verdict answers were read aloud verbatim by the clerk. (T.372-
75). The jury was polled, after which the trial court asked, "Anything else to come 
before the Court at this time?" (T.376). No objection was raised. 
On December 11, 1998, Schwartz filed an Objection to Judgment on Jury Verdict, 
the sole grounds for which was the inclusion of costs prior to submission of a 
memorandum by Benzow. (R.268). The trial court eliminated that language, and entered 
a Judgment on Jury Verdict on January 13, 1999. (R.270). On January 25, 1999, 
Schwartz filed a Motion for New Trial raising, for the first time, an objection to the jury's 
Special Verdict. (R.273). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Schwartz's arguments regarding alleged inconsistencies in the special verdict fail 
for two separate reasons. First, Schwartz waived any entitlement to challenge the verdict 
by failing to object prior to discharge of the jury. The Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently held that a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve appellate 
grounds, because the jury who heard the case should be given an opportunity to clarify 
any ambiguities in its findings. 
In any event, the answers to the special verdict interrogatories are not 
irreconcilably inconsistent. The jury's intent - that Schwartz not recover against Benzow 
- was clear, as evidenced by its allocation of 50 percent fault to each of the parties and 
leaving blank the damages line. The jury had been expressly instructed that attributing 
50 percent fault or more to Schwartz would mean no recovery to her, and the overall 
verdict plainly reflects an intent to reach that result. Any ambiguity in the other questions 
should be disregarded as surplusage which does not override the jury's dispositive 
findings. 
The district court's decision to allow Officer Bigler to testify as to the statements 
of Erica Wolfe and Carolyn was not an abuse of discretion. It was undispuated that 
Troop Bigler took the statements as part of his official duties, and incorporated them in a 
report prepared pursuant to those duties. Accordingly, the evidence was admissible under 
the public report exception, U.R.E. 803(8). Additionally, the evidence was admissible 
under U.R.E. 803(1) as a present sense impression. When Erica Wolfe made her 
statement to Officer Bigler, she was still lying on the ground at the accident scene. 
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Carolyn's statement was made shortly thereafter, at the hospital. Both statements 
qualified for admission under subsection 1. 
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Schwartz's 
proposed jury instruction no. 22. The instruction was untimely under a previously 
entered scheduling order, would have required additional clarification to the jury, and 
was essentially covered in other instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SCHWARTZ IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
A. Schwartz waived any right to seek relief from the jury verdict by failing to 
object prior to discharge of the jury. 
Schwartz's principal argument on appeal is that the district court should have 
granted a new trial based upon what Schwartz characterizes as "the incomprehensible 
jury verdict." Although the verdict form when viewed in its entirety would not support a 
new trial in any event, this Court should not even reach the issue because Schwartz 
waived it in the court below. 
The special verdict form submitted to the jury was substantially identical to MUJI 
Form 36.1, particularly with regard to questions 1 through 5. Schwartz did not object to 
the form. (T.298). 
The jury's answers to the special verdict interrogatories were read aloud by the 
clerk in the presence of counsel. The inconsistencies alleged on appeal were, according 
to Schwartz, "glaring," "blatant," "obvious," and "readily apparent." (Brief of Appellant 
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at 4, 6, 9). Nonetheless, counsel made no effort to address his concerns with the 
appropriate person - the trial judge - at the appropriate time - before the jury had been 
discharged. 
Schwartz concedes that "[n]ormally, a party is not permitted to move for a new 
trial on grounds that the verdict was defective, if it fails to take appropriate action before 
discharge of the jury." (Brief of Appellant at 10). Indeed, the proscription is quite 
unambigous: "It is the rule in Utah that a failure to object to a verdict, informal or 
insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged, constitutes a waiver of that 
objection." Ute-Cal Land Development Corp., 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980). 
The rationale behind the rule is, of course, that any clarifications needed can be 
made by the jury while it is still impaneled. "The proper procedure when an informal or 
insufficient verdict has been returned is for the trial court to require the jury to return for 
further deliberation . . . . It is well established by numerous authorities that when a verdict 
is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, any error in said verdict 
is waived by the party relying thereon who at the time of its rendition failed to make any 
request that its informality or uncertainty be corrected." Id, quoting Cohn v. J. C. 
Penney Co., Inc., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (1975). 
Schwartz offers no reason for failing to object at the time the verdict was 
announced, other than a suggestion that no objection was necessary because the alleged 
error was patent, and "counsel for Schwartz was not provided a copy of the completed 
jury form until after the jury was discharged." (Brief of Appellant at 10). A similar 
argument was made - and soundly rejected - in Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 
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(Utah 1981), in which a jury awarded special damages to the plaintiff but no general 
damages. After being sent back to rectify the discrepancy, the jury returned with a 
verdict in the same amount, this time awarding all general damages and no special 
damages. The jury was excused, after which the plaintiff objected to the verdict. The 
trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for a new trial, and an appeal followed. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the verdict on its face, including some 
additional language which had not been read by the clerk, clearly showed an improper 
verdict warranting a new trial. As in this case, counsel complained that he had not been 
given a copy of the verdict form until after the jury was excused. After considering 
whether the jury's answers could be reconciled, the Supreme Court cut to the chase: 
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the record is clear that at no time prior 
to the release of the jury, did either counsel object to the verdict or even 
request to see it. Plaintiff specifically contends on appeal that the court 
failed to give counsel an opportunity to examine the verdict before it was 
resubmitted to the jury and before the jury was dismissed. Plaintiff 
acknowledges that unless timely objected to at trial, any irregularity 
appearing on the face of the jury verdict is waived. Plaintiff asserts, 
however, that the trial court has the burden of providing counsel with an 
opportunity to examine the verdict, and that by failing to provide the 
verdict to counsel the court has denied counsel the opportunity to object. 
Such is not the law. Clearly, counsel has the obligation not only to object 
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively seek to examine it. 
636P.2datl043. 
The court concluded that, "by failing to request court permission to examine the 
verdict, plaintiff has waived any objection to the form of the verdict." Id The same 
result is even more appropriate in this case, where there is no suggestion that any part of 
the jury's verdict was omitted during the clerk's reading. The answers were read plainly 
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and clearly, and could easily be tracked with a blank special verdict form or piece of 
paper. (T.373-75). 
Schwartz cites Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 
(Utah 1985) for the proposition that no waiver occurred. Bennion does indeed note an 
exception to the waiver rule "when a verdict is so ambiguous, contradictory or illogical 
that it does not clearly indicate for whom the verdict is rendered, and the verdict would 
leave the Court in the position of having no alternative but to guess at what the jury 
intended." Id at 1083. No such situation exists here. It is quite clear what the jury 
intended: No recovery for Schwartz, because she was equally to blame for causing the 
accident - hence the "no" answers on negligence, the 50/50 allocation of fault, and the 
blank damages line. The other two answers may be a bit unusual, but the overall intent is 
quite plain. 
"The rule requiring an objection if there is some ambiguity serves the objective of 
avoiding the expense and additional time for a new trial by having the jury which heard 
the facts clarify the ambiguity while it is able to do so," the Supreme Court wrote in 
Bennion. Just as the court ultimately held in that case, failure to object to the special 
verdict precludes a belated challenge on appeal. 
B. The verdict is not irreconcilably inconsistent in any event. 
Appellee acknowledges that the jury's negative responses to questions 1 and 3 and 
its affirmative responses to questions 2 and 4 might appear inconsistent. However, those 
responses must be examined in light of the jury's response to question 5, in which the 
jury allocated any negligence of the parties equally between them. 
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In the trial court's instruction number 11, the jury was expressly informed as to the 
consequences of attributing fifty percent or more of the negligence to plaintiff, namely 
that she would recover nothing: 
No. 11: If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must 
decide if the plaintiff was also negligent. If the plaintiff was negligent and 
the plaintiffs negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's own 
injuries, the plaintiff's negligence must be compared to the negligence of 
the defendant. 
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the total 
negligence causing the plaintiff's injuries may still recover compensation, 
but the amount will be reduced by the percentage of the plaintiff's 
negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than the 
negligence is equal to or greater than the negligence of the defendant, then 
the plaintiff may recover nothing. 
For example, if you find the plaintiffs negligence was 30 percent of 
all negligence causing the injuries, then the plaintiffs recovery will be 
reduced by 30 percent. On the other hand, if you find the plaintiff's 
negligence is 50 percent or greater, then the plaintiff will recover nothing. 
(T.321-22; emphasis added). See also Instruction No. 32 (T.332). 
The jury's negative response to question 1, when read with its allocation of fifty 
percent of any negligence to Schwartz, clearly indicates the jury's intent to find that 
Schwartz was not entitled to recover any damages from Benzow. Consistent with that 
intent, the jury left the damages line blank. The jury's other answers may best be viewed 
as surplusage, which do not affect the dispositive findings. E.g., Turpie v. Southwest 
Cardiology Associates, 124 N.M. 787, 955 P.2d 716, 720 (App. 1998) (jury finding of 
causation as to wife's derivative injuries and award of damages to wife properly 
disregarded as surplusage in light of finding of no causation as to husband's death), 
Nania v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 60 Wash. App. 706, 806 P.2d 787 
(1991) (JurY answers allocating contributing negligence to three defendants was 
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surplusage, where ultimate finding of proximate cause was dispositive); Lonardo v. 
Litvak Meat Co., 676 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Colo. App. 1983) (inconsistent jury findings 
on causation and damages were "irrelevant" and "harmless" because "jury's intention 
that plaintiffs not recover any damages was clear" from allocation of 50 percent fault to 
each party). 
Schwartz acknowledges that "[a] jury's answers to special interrogatories must be 
read harmoniously." (Brief of Appellant at 10). Appellee agrees. The jury's intent was 
clear, and there is no cause for a new trial. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING OFFICER BIGLER'S TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE STATEMENTS OF ERICA WOLFE AND 
CAROLYN, AND ANY CLAIMED ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
IN ANY EVENT. 
Trooper Jeffrey Bigler has been with the Highway Patrol for more than 16 years, 
and has been stationed in the Cedar City area since 1987. (T. 237-38). During his tenure 
with the Highway Patrol, Bigler has received extensive training in motor vehicle accident 
investigation, including basic, intermediate, and advanced investigation courses, and has 
investigated thousands of accidents. (T. 238-39). Bigler's job duties include determining 
the cause of accidents, and completing accident reports indicating primary and 
contributing causes. (T. 263). 
As part of his duties, Bigler normally interviews persons involved in an accident, 
and did so in this case. (T. 249). Bigler was dispatched directly to the accident site, 
where he saw the damaged bicycles and two injured women lying on the side of the road. 
(T. 247-49, 261). Bigler interviewed both of the victims, Rae Lyn Schwartz; and Erica 
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Wolfe, and other persons who were present. (T. 249-51). He subsequently prepared a 
report, which was duly filed with the Highway Patrol. (T. 240-41). 
During trial, counsel for Schwartz objected to testimony from Bigler pertaining to 
statements he had gathered from Wolfe and another bicyclist, "Carolyn," arguing that the 
evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay. (T. 192-98).l Schwartz apparently was 
concerned that Erica and Carolyn's statements contradicted her account of the accident. 
1
 The entire testimony regarding Erica's statement was as follows: 
"She told me that when her and Rae Lyn had crashed on their bikes, that Rae Lyn had 
went down first, and that Erica had crashed into Rae Lyn. Erica told me that she was 
riding approximately 12 feet behind and approximately 1 foot to the right of Rae Lyn. 
Erica said that Rae Lyn was riding in the center of the lane, and Erica was more towards 
the shoulder. . . . Erica also said she doesn't remember a jeep coming by Rae Lyn. Just 
that Rae Lyn had went down on the road and that Erica had ran into Rae Lyn." (T. 252-
53). 
The testimony regarding Carolyn's statement consisted of the following: 
"Carolyn told me that she doesn't remember a jeep hitting Rae Lyn. She said that when 
the jeep passed, it did pass close to the group. Carolyn said that the jeep was 
approximately 15 feet ahead of Rae Lyn when Rae Lyn went down, and Carolyn was on 
a bike approximately 20 feet behind Erica when Rae Lyn went down." (T. 253-54). 
2
 Ironically, testimony elicited by Schwartz' own counsel would have provided the jury 
with the same inference. For example, counsel asked Bigler: 
Q. Did you have any reason to doubt Rae Lyn Schwartz when she told you that 
she had been hit by a jeep? 
A. Initially no. 
Q. Initially. You did later? 
A. After I had talked to everybody. (T. 279). 
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony. Bigler's 
testimony was admissible under at least two exceptions to the hearsay rule.3 Utah Rule 
of Evidence 803(8) provides for the admission of 
records, reports, statements, or date compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (B) matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law as to which matters there is a duty to report . . . or (C) in 
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority 
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
"The public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule (Rule 803(8)) is 
premised on the idea that 'public employees presumably are diligent in gathering and 
recording information for their employer, the government.' Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
Evidentiary Foundations 291 (3d ed. 1995). Under usual circumstances, 'since the 
assurances of accuracy are usually even greater for public records than for regular 
business records, the proponent is not required to establish their admissibility through 
foundation testimony.' 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger9 Weinstein's Federal 
Evidence @ 803.13[ 11 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)." J. S. 
v. State, 939 P.2d 196, 201 n.3 (Utah App. 1997). 
In J. S., the appellant challenged the admission of a caseworker's report which 
consisted entirely of statements by other individuals. "The caseworker testified that she 
3
 Schwartz notes that the trial court did not complete its statement when overruling her 
objection to the evidence. The trial court's statements do not control the admissibility of 
evidence. See, e.g., J. S. v. State, 939 P.2d 196, 200 n.2 (Utah App. 1997) ("It is 
appropriate to uphold the admission of the predisposition report under Rule 803(8) even 
if that was not the basis specified at trial, as long as the elements of the rule were 
established.") 
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had no personal knowledge of the information in her report. The record reflects that in 
preparing her report, the caseworker relied on CPS referral records and assessments of 
the children, as well as other secondary sources. During cross examination, the 
caseworker admitted that she did not know the names of the CPS investigators upon 
whose reports she relied. She also did not know who made various substantiated and 
unsubstantiated referrals, or the specifics of many of the referrals of neglect or abuse." 
Id at 199. 
This Court upheld admission of the report under Rule 803(8), because it was 
prepared by the caseworker as part of her official duties. See also Yacht Club v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1225-27 (Utah 1984) (to fall within scope of 
Rule 803(8)'s predecessor, report need only have been prepared by a public official, and 
making the report must be within scope of official's duties). In this case, there is no 
question that Officer Bigler was acting in his capacity as a public official, and that his 
duties included interviewing witnesses and preparing accident reports.4 
As a second basis for admissibility, counsel for Benzow cited the court to Rule 
803(1), which permits admission of "a statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter." When Officer Bigler interviewed her, Erica Wolfe was still lying on the side 
of the road, and he interviewed Carolyn shortly thereafter at the hospital. (T. 247, 249). 
4
 Schwartz appears to suggest that Rule 803(8) is inapplicable to Bigler's oral testimony. 
(Brief of Appellant at 14). Officer Bigler was testifying from a review of his report, 
however (T.241), and Rule 803(8) applies to reports or statements "in any form." 
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It was well within the district court's discretion to admit the evidence under this 
exception. 
Finally, even if the district court had committed error in admitting the testimony, 
there is no indication that such error substantially prejudiced Schwartz. There was ample 
evidence from which the jury could have reached the same conclusion, namely that both 
parties were equally at fault for Schwartz' accident. For example, the jury likely found 
significant that not a single witness - other than Schwartz herself - testified that the jeep 
struck the bicycle handlebars, even though Schwartz's own eyewitness said he saw the 
handlebars jerk around. 
Moreover, as counsel for Benzow pointed out, while Schwartz might have 
believed that is what happened, she had suffered a painful impact to her head, and her 
recollection might not have been accurate. (T. 361-62). The jeep was covered in dust, 
yet the officer's thorough inspection could not uncover any scuff mark or other sign of an 
impact. Mr. and Mrs. Benzow both testified that they never got within two feet of 
Schwartz. This evidence, along with Schwartz' inexperience as a bicyclist in general, 
and on this stretch of road in particular, was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude 
that, while perhaps in hindsight Mr. Benzow should not have honked his horn at the 
riders, or perhaps he edged a little too close for the bicyclists' comfort, the accident was 
equally the result of Schwartz overreacting and losing control of her bicycle at a high 
speed. 
Schwartz has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion by the trial court, or that any 
alleged error was sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DECLINING TO ADD AN UNTIMELY INSTRUCTION 
TO THE JURY REGARDING PASSING ZONES. 
During the course of proceedings, the district court entered a scheduling order. A 
trial date was set for November 18, 1998; jury instructions were to be submitted by 
October 20, 1998. (R. 43). The order stated: "Failure to submit . . . Request for Jury 
Instructions and Special Voir Dire questions within the time prescribed will result in the 
Court rejecting the late filing or non-filing of items, and the Court will deem them to 
have been waived . . . . " (Id.). 
On the second day of trial, Schwartz requested for the first time three new jury 
instructions, including her proposed Instruction No. 22. (T.308-09). That proposed 
instruction restated Section 2 of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-59: 
Where signs or markings are in place to define a no-passing zone under 
Subsection (1), an operator may not drive on the left side of the roadway 
within the no-passing zone or on the left side of any pavement striping 
designated to mark the no-passing zone throughout its lengths. 
The purpose of the proposed instruction was to inform the jury that crossing a 
double yellow line is unlawful. (Brief of Appellant at 16).5 Schwartz states that the trial 
court declined to give the instruction, but omits to mention the court's reasoning. 
Benzow's objection to the proposed instruction was on several grounds, including 
untimeliness, duplication, and prejudice: 
5
 Schwartz states in her brief that "her theory was that defendant crossed the yellow lines 
and struck Schwartz." (Brief of Appellant at 16). Technically, that statement of her 
theory is accurate. However, it should be reiterated for clarity that crossing of the double 
line occurred while Benzow and Schwartz were headed the same direction. Schwartz 
was not in the oncoming lane, which might be suggested by Schwartz's wording. 
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Well, your Honor, it was my understanding we were supposed to 
have instructions in at pretrial. I think if you're going to have statutory 
duties imposed, then you also have to add additional instructions that the 
violation of statute is evidence of negligence, but it's not negligence, per se. 
You have to include the MUJI instruction that says something to the 
effect that in order to find a violation the statute is negligent, you have to 
find about eight different things that was inactive to protect the individuals 
involved. If you start putting in statutes as setting the duty, then there are 
other MUJI instructions that ought to be given. 
* * * 
Instruction No. 19 is setting forth the duties, common law duties. I 
don't think the plaintiff is being prejudiced because 19 goes through 8 
subparts telling them what the duties of a driver are. 
After additional dialogue, the Court concluded: "Since we did have the cutoff 
earlier, I'm just going to go with 19 the way it is." (T.313). This decision was well 
within the trial court's discretion, particularly as the duties of motor vehicle operators 
were extensively addressed in other instructions: 
[No. 18]: The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise 
reasonable care at all times to avoid placing others in danger and to avoid 
causing an accident. 
No. 19: The driver of any vehicle has the duty to use reasonable 
care to avoid danger. In that regard every driver is required, one, to keep a 
lookout for other vehicles and highway conditions that reasonably may be 
anticipated; two, to keep the vehicle under proper control; three, to drive at 
a safe speed, having proper regard for the width, surface and conditions of 
the highway, other traffic, visibility and any existing or potential hazards; 
four, to follow another vehicle at a safe distance with proper regard for both 
vehicles' speed, other traffic and highway conditions; five, to stop or 
suddenly slow down only after observing that it can be done safely and if 
an opportunity exists after signaling; six, to drive in one lane whenever 
possible and to change lanes only after observing that it can be done safely 
and after giving the appropriate signal; seven, to drive on the correct side of 
the highway; eight, to pass others only after observing that it can be done 
safely. 
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No. 20. Even if a driver complies with an applicable statute, 
ordinance or safety rule, this does not excuse that driver from the duty to 
act with reasonable care in other respects. One must always maintain a 
proper lookout for other traffic and hazards reasonably anticipated on the 
highway, and keep one's car under proper control. 
No. 21: The law provides that any person driving a motor vehicle on 
a public highway shall keep a proper lookout. A proper lookout means 
maintaining the lookout that an ordinary careful person will use in light of 
all conditions existing at the time, and those reasonably to be anticipated. A 
proper lookout includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, 
to seek that which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This 
duty does not merely require looking, but also requires observing and 
understanding other traffic and general situations. 
(T.325-26). 
Additionally, it can hardly be said that the verdict would have been different if the 
instruction had been given. The jury already knew that Mr. Benzow had crossed a double 
yellow line while passing, and that doing so was a violation of the law. Officer Bigler 
had so testified, and Mr. Benzow had admitted it. Schwartz's counsel emphasized it in 
winding up his closing argument: "Mr. Benzow passed on a double line. The evidence, I 
think, is very clear as to his negligence and the fact that his negligence caused her 
injuries." (T. 371). See also T. 350. The jury instruction would have added nothing 
new. 
Failing to give the untimely jury instruction, which would have required additional 
clarifying instructions, and which did not add anything to the duties already explained to 
the jury, was not an abuse of discretion, and does not support Schwartz's request for a 
new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellee respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
district court's judgment. 
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